

Malware Dynamic Analysis Part 6

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<http://opensecuritytraining.info/MalwareDynamicAnalysis.html>

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Where are we at?

- Part 5: Using an all-in-one sandbox
 - Cuckoo Sandbox
 - Malware Attribute Enumeration and Characterization (MAEC)
 - Different sandbox results comparison
- Part 6: Actionable output
 - Yara
 - Snort

Yara

- Open source tool to identify and classify malicious files based on textual or binary patterns
- Light-weight way of performing signature checks
- Can be used for any binary data (exe, pdf, pcaps, etc)
- Useful in an email server for tip-offs, and filtering

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[References]

- yara-project, <http://code.google.com/p/yara-project/>

Yara Signature (1)

```
rule silent_banker : banker
{
  meta:
    description = "This is just an example"
    thread_level = 3
    in_the_wild = true

  strings:
    $a = {6A 40 68 00 30 00 00 6A 14 8D 91}
    $b = {8D 4D B0 2B C1 83 C0 27 99 6A 4E 59 F7 F9}
    $c = "UVODFRYSIHLNWPEJXQZAKCBGMT"

  condition:
    $a or $b or $c
}
```

<http://code.google.com/p/yara-project/>

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Yara Signature (2)

- Identifier
 - Any alphanumeric characters and underscores but cannot start with a number
- String definition
 - A string identifier starts with \$ followed by alphanumeric character and underscores
 - Values
 - Text strings enclosed by double quotes
 - Hex strings enclosed by curly brackets
 - Regular expression enclosed by slashes

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[References]

- Víctor Manuel Álvarez, YARA User's Manual 1.6, <http://code.google.com/p/yara-project/downloads/detail?name=YARA%20User%27s%20Manual%201.6.pdf>

Yara Signature (3)

- Condition operators
 - Boolean
 - and, or, not
 - Relational
 - >=, <=, <, >, ==, !=
 - Arithmetic
 - +, -, *, /
 - Bitwise
 - &, |, <<, >>, ~
- Counting strings
 - strings:
 - \$a = "text"
 - condition:
 - #a == 6



Bot classification

- We will make a Yara signature for a bot malware in this lab
 - 1) Identify characteristic strings from the agobot sample
 - `$ strings ~/MalwareClass/samples/agobot/malware.exe`
`> /tmp/agobot.txt`
 - 2) Make an Yara signature using combination of the identified strings
 - Create a file (e.g. `detection.yar`) for the signature
 - 3) Run Yara
 - `$ yara detection.yar ~/MalwareClass/samples/agobot/malware.exe`



One possible answer

```
rule Agobot
{
  strings:
    $msg = "PhatBNC" nocase
    $conf1 = "ddos_maxthreads"
    $conf2 = "scan_maxsockets"
    $conf3 = "scan_maxthreads"
    $cmd1 = "do_stealth"
    $cmd2 = "do_avkill"
    $cmd3 = "do_speedtest"
    $cmd4 = "bot_topiccmd"
    $cmd5 = "bot_meltserver"
    $cmd6 = "bot_randnick"
  condition:
    (#msg > 10) and $conf1 and $conf2 and $conf3
    and (any of ($cmd1, $cmd2, $cmd3, $cmd4, $cmd5, $cmd6))
}
```

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Where are we at?

- Part 5: Using an all-in-one sandbox
 - Cuckoo Sandbox
 - Malware Attribute Enumeration and Characterization (MAEC)
 - Different sandbox results comparison
- Part 6: Actionable output
 - Yara
 - **Snort**

Snort (1)



- Open source network intrusion detection/prevention tool (NIDS/NIPS)
- 3 modes
 - Sniffer: read packets off the network and display on the screen
 - Packet Logger: logs the packets to a log file
 - NIDS: analyze network traffic and match with user-defined signatures and make actions (e.g. alert, drop, etc.)

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[References]

- Snort, <http://www.snort.org/>
- Snort Users Manual 2.9.4, http://s3.amazonaws.com/snort-org/www/assets/166/snort_manual.pdf

[Image Sources]

- http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_2lvFH57W8Hc/TPfpzDtwQwI/AAAAAAAAAFk/YFngxr8jLgl/s1600/snort_large.gif

Snort (2)



- Preprocessors provides various pre-detection processing
 - Frag3: IP defragmentation
 - Stream5: TCP/UDP session tracking
 - RPC decode: RPC record defragmentation
 - HTTP Inspect: HTTP fields identification, normalization etc.
- A preprocessor may depends on the other
- Supports custom preprocessor

Snort Signatures (1)



- Detection can be implemented in preprocessor, Snort (text) rules, or SO (shared object) rules.
- Snort rules

 SRC IP PORT DEST IP PORT
alert tcp any any -> any 80 (msg:"No deadbeef"; content:"DEADBEEF";)

- Rule headers
 - Rule action tells Snort what to do (e.g. alert, log, drop)
 - IP addresses in Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR) notation
 - Port numbers
 - Direction operator should be “->” or “<>” (bidirectional)

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[References]

- Pre-Compile SO Rules: Supported Platforms, <https://www.snort.org/snort-rules/shared-object-rule>

Snort Signatures (2)



- Rule options
 - Separated by semicolon (;)
 - msg: message to be displayed in log
 - content: ascii string or binary to match
 - content modifiers
 - nocase, depth, offset, distance, within, http_header, http_client_body, http_uri, file_data
 - pcre: match can be written in perl compatible regular expression
 - flags: checks TCP flag bit
 - sid: required field, Snort rule identifier



Detect Beaconing Traffic (1)

- We will write a NIDS signature for this lab on the host machine
 - `$ wireshark ~/MalwareClass/misc/darkshell.pcap &`
- Lab is already configured
 - Fixed the permission violation error
`$ sudo usermod -aG snort student`
 - Set HOME_NET to 192.168.57.0/24 in
`/etc/snort/snort.conf`
- Let's run Snort with the existing Snort rules
 - `$ snort -c /etc/snort/snort.conf -r
~/MalwareClass/misc/darkshell.pcap -l /tmp`



Detect Beaconing Traffic (2)

- Open a new file to write a Snort rule
- You can start with the following template and fill up detection rule options

```
alert tcp any any -> any any ( <your rule options here> )
```

- To test your rule

```
$ snort -c <rule file path> -r <pcap file path> -l /tmp
```


Phone Home Format

```
// Darkshell bot-to-CnC comms
struct {
    // Header:
    DWORD dwMagic; // always 0x00000010 for Darkshell
    // Obfuscated section:
    char szComputerName[64]; // Name of infected host, NULL-terminated/extended
    char szMemory[32]; // Amount of memory in infected host; format "%dMB"; NULL-terminated/
    extended
    char szWindowsVersion[32]; // Specifies version of Windows; one of: Windows98, Windows95,
    // WindowsNT, Windows2000, WindowsXP, Windows2003, or Win Vista;
    // NULL-terminated/extended
    char szBotVersion[32]; // Specifies version of bot; NULL-terminated/extended;
    DWORD szUnknown1[4]; // ??? - Always NULL-terminated 'n'
    // Binary section:
    char szPadding1[32]; // Filled with 0x00 bytes
    WORD wUnknown2; // ??? - We have seen 0x00A0, 0x00B0, and 0x00C0
    WORD wUnknown3; // ??? - Always 0xFD7F
    char szPadding2[20]; // Filled with 0x00 bytes
    WORD wUnknown4; // ??? - Always 0xB0FC
    BYTE cUnknown5; // ??? - We have seen 0xD6, 0xD7, 0xE6, 0xE7, and 0xF1
    BYTE cZero; // Always 0x00
    DWORD dwSignature[8]; // Always 0x00000000, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0x18EE907C, 0x008E917C,
    // 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFA8D91&C, 0x25D6907C, 0xCFEA907C
};
```

<http://ddos.arbornetworks.com/2011/01/darkshell-a-ddos-bot-targetting-vendors-of-industrial-food-processing-equipment/>

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What we learned in Part 1

- How an isolated malware analysis lab is setup
 - Ubuntu, Virtualbox, inetsim
- Malware terminology
 - Bot, RAT, etc.
 - Heterogeneous vendor naming
- RAT exploration - Poison IVY
 - Implant and Controller
- Behavioral malware analysis approaches
 - Diffing, monitoring, API tracing, etc.

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What we learned in Part 2

- Background concepts
 - PE files, Windows Libraries, Processes, Registry, Windows Services
 - TrID, Process Explorer, Process Monitor, PsService, CFF Explorer
- Persistence techniques
 - Registry, File system, Windows services
 - Autoruns, Regshot

What we learned in Part 3

- Background concepts
 - API, Threads
- Maneuvering techniques
(How malware strategically positions itself to access critical resources)
 - DLL and code injection, DLL search order hijacking, IAT, EAT, and inline hooking
 - Procmon, WinApiOverride, Winobj

What we learned in Part 4

- Background concepts
 - How to analyze network traffic with Wireshark
- Malware functionality
 - Key logging
 - Phone home
 - Beaconsing
 - Self-Avoidance
 - Security degrading
 - Simple stealth techniques (non-rootkit techniques)
 - Self-destruction
 - Hiding files

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What we learned in Part 5/6

- Using an all-in-one sandbox
 - Good for automation and the first cut
 - How to use Cuckoo Sandbox
 - How to analyze sandboxes' results
 - Malware Attribute Enumeration and Characterization (MAEC)
- Actionable output – detection signatures
 - Snort: network intrusion detection/prevention system
 - Yara: Malware identification and classification tool

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
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All samples are from openmalware.org

- 101d00e77b48685bc02c1ff9672e1e94 eldorado/malware.exe
- 9250281b5a781edb9b683534f8916392 agobot/malware.exe
- 3349eab5cc4660bafa502f7565ff761d conficker/malware.exe
- 9f880ac607cbd7cdfffa609c5883c708 Hydraq/malware.exe
- a10b9b75e8c7db665cfd7947e93b999b parite/malware.exe
- d7578e550c0a4d4aca0cfd01ae19a331 spyeye/malware.exe
- df150905e2537db936ef323f48e2c1bb magania/malware.exe
- 4a29d41dfda9cfcbcde4d42b4bbb00aa Darkshell/malware.exe
- 1a36fb10f0a6474a9fea23ee4139d13e nitol/malware.exe
- db19c23c5f77a697500075c790cd331c IMworm/malware.exe
- a9a2fb545068995f30df22f8a3f22a10 onlinegames/2/malware.exe
- f1bae35d296930d2076b9d84ba0c95ea onlinegames/1/malware.exe

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The End

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